Following George Floyd’s death in 2020, Los Angeles experienced large-scale protests that lasted about ten days. While many protests were peaceful, others were not. In response, the LAPD imposed curfews, declared some protests unlawful, and used non-lethal force to control crowds, arresting thousands. A lawsuit was filed against the City and LAPD Chief Michel Moore, claiming that the LAPD used excessive force, made wrongful arrests, and restricted protesters’ First Amendment rights. The lawsuit represents four groups: those affected by direct force, those arrested, those charged with infractions, and those seeking to prevent the LAPD from using certain practices like excessive force and unreasonable curfews.
To certify these groups, plaintiffs need to show that their claims share common legal questions. The district court approved all four groups, but didn’t fully analyze whether the claims met the necessary legal standards. The case was sent back for further review to ensure the claims meet these requirements.
During the protests, tensions escalated. While many protests remained peaceful, some turned violent. The LAPD responded with arrests, curfews, and non-lethal measures. Injuries ranged from minor to severe, with claims of excessive force and mistreatment during arrests. Many protesters were detained under harsh conditions, with varying levels of treatment depending on the circumstances. Protesters were arrested for a range of offenses, from curfew violations to more serious crimes like looting and assault. The ongoing legal battle focuses on whether the LAPD’s actions violated constitutional rights.
About a week into the protests, plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit against the City and LAPD Chief Moore, claiming violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law. They argued that many of the LAPD’s actions during the protests were unconstitutional and sought to represent four groups:
- Direct Force Class: Protesters who were struck by “less-lethal” weapons, batons, or physical force but were not violently resisting or posing a threat.
- Arrest Class: Individuals arrested on misdemeanor charges, held on buses, and subjected to tight handcuffing and denial of basic needs like food, water, and bathroom access.
- Infraction Class: People charged with infractions, arrested, and taken into custody without being released in the field.
- Injunctive Relief Class: Anyone participating in past, present, or future protests in Los Angeles, especially those protesting police violence and racial discrimination.
The Direct Force, Arrest, and Infraction classes sought damages under the Monell doctrine, which requires proving that LAPD’s policies or practices caused constitutional violations. The plaintiffs argued that the repeated violations amounted to LAPD customs and that Chief Moore, who was present at some protests, played a direct role. They also claimed officers were not adequately trained, and that Chief Moore failed to discipline officers after learning of violations.
The Injunctive Relief Class aimed to stop LAPD from using excessive force, imposing curfews without proper dispersal opportunities, and subjecting arrestees to poor conditions like prolonged detention or tight handcuffs.
The City opposed the motion, arguing the classes did not meet legal standards, particularly that common issues did not outweigh individual ones. However, the district court certified the classes without fully addressing all of these concerns, which led the City to appeal.
Class actions are not the norm in legal cases and are often costly for defendants, who may feel pressured to settle to avoid the risk of losing big at trial. Therefore, certifying a class action is not something courts do lightly. Under Rule 23, courts must rigorously analyze whether the proposed class meets certain requirements, such as having common questions central to the case and showing that those questions can be resolved for the entire class in a single stroke.
In this case, the court certified four classes of plaintiffs related to protests in Los Angeles. However, the court did not fully analyze whether the common questions predominated over individual ones, particularly for the damages class, where plaintiffs seek compensation for constitutional violations. These claims are fact-specific, and proving them would require individualized evidence for each plaintiff, making it difficult to treat the case as a class action.
For instance, one plaintiff, Abigail Rodas, claims she was hit with a rubber bullet, but medical records suggest she may have tripped instead. Resolving whether her injury was caused by police force or an accident requires a detailed investigation, as does determining if the force used was unreasonable and if it was part of an LAPD policy. This process would need to be repeated for each class member, making it hard to address the claims collectively.
The court did not properly consider these individual differences, so the certification of the Direct Force Class was vacated. The court needs to reexamine whether common issues can truly be resolved for all class members at once.
The court vacated the certification of the Arrest Class due to similar issues as the Direct Force Class. Both classes failed to meet the necessary requirements for class certification under Rule 23. Specifically, the district court didn’t fully analyze whether common issues predominated over individual ones, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). The court accepted the plaintiffs’ claims that arrest conditions—like tight handcuffing and denial of food, water, and bathroom access—were uniform across the class, but the evidence didn’t support that. Conditions varied significantly among class members, which made the claims difficult to resolve as a group.
Similarly, the court vacated the certification of the Infraction Class. These plaintiffs alleged they were arrested without individualized suspicion, but the nature of their claims required specific fact-finding for each person, not class-wide resolution. For example, one plaintiff heard the order to disperse but couldn’t comply, while another was arrested for a different reason on a different day. These individualized issues made class treatment inappropriate.
The plaintiffs argued that since everyone in these classes was charged with an infraction, the case could still be resolved collectively. However, the court disagreed, noting that officers can legally arrest someone if they have probable cause for even minor offenses. The court directed the district court to carefully reconsider whether any of the claims could be resolved on a class-wide basis, ensuring the necessary rigorous analysis was applied.
Finally, the plaintiffs’ additional arguments—that the district court’s reference to other certification orders should suffice and that Monell claims automatically satisfy Rule 23—were rejected by the court.
The plaintiffs in this case asked the court to affirm class certification, even though the district court’s order didn’t address the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement. They argued that the district court referenced other cases where predominance was considered. However, the court ruled that simply citing other cases doesn’t meet the rigorous analysis required under Rule 23(b)(3). The cited cases, like MIWON, involved specific events with uniform experiences, unlike the current case, where injuries occurred at different protests and under various circumstances.
The plaintiffs also claimed that because they were challenging Monell policies (which involve holding a city liable for unconstitutional actions), their class should automatically meet the requirements for commonality and predominance under Rule 23. But the court rejected this, stating that Monell policies don’t bypass the need to prove that the policies caused injuries across the class. Even if there’s a common policy in question, plaintiffs must show that there’s common evidence to prove their claims for all class members.
In this case, plaintiffs couldn’t demonstrate that the same policy applied to everyone, especially since many of their injuries were caused by individual officers’ actions rather than city-wide policies. They also couldn’t rely on vague claims about poor training or Chief Moore’s involvement because not all officers were untrained, and Chief Moore wasn’t present at every protest. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs couldn’t rely on general allegations to certify the class and needed to provide specific evidence that the policies affected everyone in the class equally.
The court vacated the certification of the Injunctive Relief Class because the district court didn’t properly address the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a). For an injunctive class to be certified, there must be common questions that can resolve all class members’ claims “in one stroke.” The district court didn’t analyze whether such common questions existed.
The plaintiffs argued that this wasn’t necessary because they had already received an injunction, but the court emphasized that certification still requires proving commonality. The court noted that, unlike other protest-related cases that involved smaller, more uniform groups, this class included a wide range of people—some who were not harmed, others arrested for serious crimes, and even those who committed violent acts during the protests. This broad range of experiences made it unclear what, if anything, all class members had in common.
Other courts handling George Floyd protest cases denied similar class certifications for the same reasons. For example, courts in California and Oregon refused to certify classes that included people injured by forces other than the police or involved in protests that were not peaceful. The district court was instructed to reconsider whether there are any common questions uniting the Injunctive Relief Class. If not, the class should not be certified.
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