The tragic events leading to Robert Anderson’s death originated from a 911 call seeking assistance in a domestic violence incident. Officers Wright and Willey, responding to the call, wore body cameras that recorded the encounter. Upon arrival at Mr. Anderson’s home, the officers were informed by the distressed minor children that their parents were fighting, and their mother needed an ambulance. Officer Wright called for medics and learned there were no weapons except a BB gun in the house. After announcing themselves, the officers entered the home, with Willey drawing his weapon as they encountered Mr. Anderson in the kitchen. Despite commands to get on the ground, Mr. Anderson ran towards the officers, prompting Willey to fire three shots, followed by two shots from Wright. Mr. Anderson succumbed to his injuries.
Mr. Anderson’s family filed a lawsuit, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted qualified immunity on all constitutional claims and declined jurisdiction over state-law claims. Plaintiffs appeal specifically on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the officers.
The crux of the plaintiffs’ excessive-force claim hinges on the clearly established prong, which requires a right to be so unmistakable that any reasonable official would recognize its violation. The Supreme Court clarifies that a case directly on point is not necessary, but existing precedent must place the constitutional question beyond debate. This specificity is crucial in Fourth Amendment cases, where officers may struggle to apply legal doctrine to dynamic situations. High-level generality in cases is unlikely to establish rights, and a clearly established right usually demands controlling authority or a consensus of persuasive cases. Plaintiffs must demonstrate either the obvious nature of their case under general principles or cite specific cases controlling or reflecting a consensus in similar situations.
The plaintiffs argue against the grant of qualified immunity, asserting that genuine disputes of material fact, such as whether Anderson was reaching for the officers’ weapons when shot, persist. While genuine disputes cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage, an evaluation of qualified immunity can proceed by assuming the correctness of the non-moving party’s version of material facts, as established by legal precedent.
The analysis begins by asserting that, when viewed in favor of the plaintiffs, the facts do not demonstrate an obvious violation of Mr. Anderson’s constitutional rights. Drawing on relevant legal precedents, the court highlights the exceptional nature of cases where obvious constitutional violations have been found. For instance, in Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court considered the obviousness of an Eighth Amendment violation involving the cruel treatment of a prison inmate, emphasizing that the violation should have been apparent even without specific controlling authority.
The court acknowledges that the “obviousness principle” is challenging in the Fourth Amendment context, given the diverse and unpredictable nature of encounters between officers and suspects. Fourth Amendment violations, it asserts, must be “beyond debate” to be considered obvious. Notably, the court references prior cases where obvious constitutional violations were found, such as the unwarranted seizure of witnesses and the arrest of a compliant sixth-grade student with no apparent wrongdoing.
In contrast, the court contends that the officers in Anderson’s case did not obviously violate his right to be free from excessive force. The circumstances, including Anderson’s aggressive behavior, failure to comply with orders, and rapid approach towards the officers, are deemed non-obviously unreasonable. The court emphasizes the complexity of the situation, highlighting that the officers were responding to an active domestic violence incident, lacked sufficient time for a thorough assessment, and were compelled to make split-second decisions in a confined space. The conclusion is drawn that, even assuming Anderson was unarmed and not reaching for a weapon, it was not obvious that the officers were constitutionally restricted from using force under the circumstances presented.
In this case, the absence of an obvious constitutional violation requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate controlling authorities or a consensus of persuasive cases that would have unequivocally informed every reasonable officer that the conduct of Officers Wright and Willey violated the Fourth Amendment. The cases cited by the plaintiffs for comparison are found to be distinguishable. In Zion v. County of Orange, an officer shot an individual nine times, and subsequently fired nine more rounds and stomped on the individual’s head, which was deemed an obvious constitutional violation. However, the court differentiates this case from Zion, emphasizing that Anderson was on his feet when shot, and the sequential nature of the shots align more with the uncontested shots in Zion.
Similarly, the plaintiffs’ reliance on Ting v. United States, A.K.H. ex rel. Landeros v. City of Tustin, and Cruz v. City of Anaheim is dismissed. In Ting, where an FBI agent shot a suspect in the back, the court distinguishes it by pointing out that Anderson was advancing towards the officers, unlike Ting who was not lunging at agents or attempting to retrieve a weapon. A.K.H. involved an unarmed man shot by an officer during a domestic violence incident, but the court underscores the distinctions, such as the unknown physical condition of Anderson’s wife and the officers being in a confined space without a physical barrier. In Cruz, where multiple officers shot an unarmed suspect, the court emphasizes the presence of disputed facts, contrasting it with the facts in Anderson’s case, where there is no dispute that Anderson ignored commands and rapidly approached the officers.
The court concludes that none of the cited cases are sufficiently analogous to put a reasonable officer on notice that the use of deadly force in the present situation would be unconstitutional. Consequently, Officers Wright and Willey are deemed entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court appropriately determined that Officers Wright and Willey did not violate the Andersons’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. According to Ninth Circuit precedent, the children of a deceased individual generally possess the right to assert substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court recognizes a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship and society of one’s child, protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, only official conduct that “shocks the conscience” qualifies as a due process violation.
Liability hinges on whether the circumstances allow for practical deliberation. If a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment due to an escalating situation, the conduct may be found to shock the conscience only if the officer acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. In this case, the purpose-to-harm standard applies, given the officers’ need to make a quick judgment in response to an escalating situation. Seconds after entering the home, Officers Wright and Willey encountered Anderson rapidly approaching them, leaving minimal time for actual deliberation.
Based on these facts, the court concludes that the officers’ actions do not shock the conscience. There is no evidence suggesting that the officers acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to the legitimate law enforcement objective of defending themselves. Therefore, Officers Wright and Willey did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
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